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Jurisdictional Wrangling:
US Military Troops Overseas and the Death Penalty
Alyssa K. Dragnich*
The current deployments of military forces to Iraq and Afghanistan have
caught the attention of the American public, but many Americans forget that
large numbers of their fellow citizens are also stationed elsewhere around the
world, serving in uniform. These servicemembers had been stationed overseas
before Operation IRAQI FREEDOM began, and they will remain there long
after that conflict has ended. These men and women face special circumstances:
they are US citizens, subject to the laws of the United States and the US military.
But at the same time, they are living in another country and are also subject to
the laws and jurisdiction of their host country. For the most part, negotiated
legal agreements decide which country will prosecute them in the event of
criminal misconduct, and prosecutions are handled routinely in most cases.
But if a servicemember is accused of a crime which could be punished by
the death penalty in the United States, the host country often becomes
concerned. This is especially true in Europe, where a number of treaties ban the
imposition of the death penalty in all circumstances. In these cases, European
countries try to assert their own jurisdiction over the accused so as to prevent a
possible death sentence for him or her, even when such action conflicts with a
bilateral treaty signed with the US. Such situations force European countries to
choose between conflicting international treaty obligations: one which abolishes
the death penalty and another which directs them to hand over criminal
defendants to the US military. This Development discusses the issues that arise
from such conflicting treaty obligations in the case of US servicemembers
stationed abroad and proposes solutions consistent with international law and
the current status of diplomatic relations between the US and European states.
I. STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS
Prior to World War II, the permanent overseas deployment of US military
troops was rare. But the dawning of the Cold War and America's containment
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doctrine led to permanent stationing of large numbers of US servicemembers in
foreign countries. This basing policy continued after the end of the Cold War,
and as of June 2003, the US had approximately 365,000 military personnel
stationed overseas.' The US has attempted to clarify the legal status of these
forward-deployed troops through the use of Status of Forces Agreements
("SOFAs").2 SOFAs are legally binding international agreements that address a
variety of issues, ranging from criminal and civil jurisdiction to taxes and driving
licenses.
Early international law held that a friendly state which was invited to send
its troops into another state's territory maintained jurisdiction over its own
forces. Today, customary international law takes the opposite view and holds
that jurisdiction lies with the state where the crime occurs.' When a foreign
national enters the borders of another state, he subjects himself to the laws of
the host state. SOFAs constitute a treaty exception to this customary view. In
the absence of a SOFA, therefore, a state would have exclusive jurisdiction over
foreign troops stationed within its borders.4
Perhaps the most important such agreement is the NATO SOFA, which is
both multilateral and reciprocal.' By contrast, virtually all of the bilateral SOFAs
to which the US is a party are non-reciprocal, meaning that they apply to US
troops in the "receiving" (host) country but not to that state's troops when they
are stationed in the US.6 The NATO SOFA serves as the draft for many bilateral
SOFAs today. Article VII of the NATO SOFA addresses criminal jurisdiction,
and most SOFAs currently in effect mirror its provisions.
There are two categories of jurisdiction in SOFA criminal cases: exclusive
and concurrent. The US retains exclusive criminal jurisdiction over offenses which
are criminalized under US laws but not in the receiving state.8 For example,
desertion is a crime under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") but is
not criminalized in many receiving countries. The converse is also true: if an
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offense is not a crime in the US but is a punishable crime in the receiving state,
then the receiving state has exclusive jurisdiction over the offense. 9 This
situation rarely arises however, because most civil offenses under the laws of the
receiving country also violate the general articles of the UCMJ.
Determining jurisdiction is more complicated when an offense is
punishable both in the US and in the receiving state. These are cases of concurrent
jurisdiction, and SOFAs allocate primary and secondary jurisdiction between the
two countries.' ° Ordinarily, the receiving state has primary concurrent
jurisdiction, and the United States has secondary concurrent jurisdiction. This
allocation of jurisdiction is consistent with customary international law, as
described earlier. There are two main exceptions to this rule. If the crime harms
a US citizen or US property, then the US has primary jurisdiction (the "inter se"
exception). The US also has primary jurisdiction if the offense is committed by a
servicemember in the course of performing an official duty (the "official duty"
exception). Furthermore, the state with secondary jurisdiction can request that
the primary state waive its jurisdiction and allow the secondary state to prosecute
the offense. The state with primary jurisdiction is directed to give "sympathetic
consideration" to such waiver requests. These requests are made most frequently
when the offense is especially egregious or politically significant. 2
II. THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
All European NATO states have ratified the Sixth Protocol to the
European Convention which abolishes the death penalty. 3 The European
Convention ("the Convention") is a Council of Europe treaty that promotes
adherence to the human rights outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 4 Article I of the Convention states that the "High Contracting Parties
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined
in Section I of this Convention."' 5 The Sixth Protocol is an optional addition to
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the Convention that entered into force in 1985 and abolished the death penalty
in signatory states.16
A new Protocol to the Convention has further strengthened Europe's
resolution against the death penalty. Protocol 13 became effective when ten
states ratified it, which occurred on January 7, 2003. It then entered into force in
those states immediately. This Protocol bans the death penalty in all
circumstances, closing a gap left by the Sixth Protocol for acts committed in
times of war or imminent danger of war.
While Protocol 13 covers only a few additional cases, it sends a strong
message about Europe's position on the death penalty. The Council of Europe's
Committee of Ministers' Press Release states: "The adoption [of Protocol 13] is
a strong political signal that the death penalty is unacceptable in all
circumstances.""7 While only seventeen states have ratified the Protocol to date,
forty-one states have signed it in the single year since its inception. 8 More
ratifications can be expected.
When a US servicemember is charged with a capital crime in a country that
is a signatory to either Protocol, that country is faced with conflicting treaty
obligations: follow the Protocols and prevent imposition of a possible death
sentence, or follow the SOFA and surrender jurisdiction to the US. This
dilemma attains greater political significance as opposition to the death penalty
grows in Europe. European governments are unanimously opposed to the death
penalty, and popular opposition to capital punishment has been increasing in
Europe for many years. 9 The European Union has adopted a firm anti-capital
punishment stance, and abolition of the death penalty is required for any state
seeking entry into the EU. The EU also opposes the death penalty in other
countries; it sponsors international resolutions opposing the death penalty and
writes letters to US officials urging them to commute the death sentences of
Americans currently on death row.20
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European opposition to capital punishment is now affecting the
administration of justice within the US military, as "several European receiving
states have become increasingly reluctant to allow the United States to exercise
any jurisdiction at all over capital offenses."'" European receiving states are
asserting that cases with the potential to result in a death sentence are of
"particular importance" and are reluctant to waive their primary jurisdiction in
an increasing number of cases. 22 The NATO SOFA itself only says that an
execution of a foreign servicemember may not be carried out in a receiving state
if that state does not permit capital punishment, but this is insufficient for many
European countries: they do not want to support the death penalty at all, even
by relinquishing custody of the accused servicemember so that the prosecution
and sentencing can be carried out in another country.
III. AN EXAMPLE CASE
The case of Staff Sergeant Charles D. Short illustrates the potential
jurisdictional problems that arise from the tension between countries' conflicting
treaty obligations.2 3 Short was a US Air Force member stationed in the
Netherlands in 1988. While in the Netherlands, Short murdered and
dismembered his wife, a Turkish national. Dutch police arrested Short, and he
confessed to the murder while in their custody. The US had primary concurrent
jurisdiction in the case for two reasons. First, the victim had a stronger
connection to the US than to the Netherlands, as she was not a Dutch national
and she was married to a US citizen. Second, the Netherlands had signed a
supplemental agreement to the NATO SOFA which gives the US primary
jurisdiction over its servicemembers, even when the victim of a crime committed
by a US servicemember is Dutch.
Short could have been charged with capital murder under the UCMJ. As a
signatory to the Sixth Protocol, the Dutch government refused to relinquish
custody of Short and risk subjecting him to the death penalty. A civil court in
the Hague determined that while the NATO SOFA did give primary jurisdiction
to the US, the court would not surrender Short unless the US guaranteed not to
seek the death penalty. The Commander in Chief of the US Air Force in Europe
refused to issue such a guarantee.24
A Dutch appellate court reversed the decision on the grounds that the
NATO SOFA assigned primary jurisdiction to the US and therefore the
21
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Netherlands had neither criminal nor civil jurisdiction over Short. If the
Netherlands did not have jurisdiction, then the Sixth Protocol did not apply, and
the Dutch government was free to extradite Short in accordance with the SOFA.
The appellate decision thus found a way to construe the SOFA and the Sixth
Protocol as consistent with one another.25
While the appellate decision was pending, however, Short was convicted of
manslaughter by a Dutch criminal court and sentenced to six years
imprisonment. 26 The civil appellate decision meant that the criminal conviction
had to be reversed. Had the appellate court not found a way around the Sixth
Protocol, Short might have escaped criminal punishment altogether, as the
Netherlands had no jurisdiction to prosecute (according to the appellate
decision), and the US did not have custody of Short.
In the end, the US decided not to seek the death penalty for Short, since
mental health problems prevented him from meeting the UCMJ requirements
for capital punishment. With the assurance that Short would not face the death
penalty, the Dutch government agreed to surrender him to US officials.
Because of Short's mental health issues, the US was able to evade the
Dutch demand for a guarantee not to seek capital punishment. But this
roundabout solution may not be available in future cases. As the Short case
illustrates, these situations can be extraordinarily delicate: the Dutch government
sought a guarantee not just that Short would not be executed but that also the
prosecutor would not seek the death penalty. In this case, had the two
governments not been able to reach an agreement, Short would never have
faced any consequences for the murder of his wife. He would have remained in
limbo: Dutch officials would have custody of him but would be unable to
prosecute, and US officials would be unable to assert jurisdiction to gain
custody.
IV. DIFFICULT SOLUTIONS
The difficulties associated with prosecuting Short are likely to arise in
future cases. As explained by two military attorneys, "[a]s a general rule, each
peacetime offense for which the death penalty is authorized for U.S. military
courts is a concurrent jurisdiction offense."27 Since each state has the authority
to prosecute the offense, determining which state has primary jurisdiction will
become more important. When the death penalty is at issue, the receiving state
may have a strong interest in maintaining primary jurisdiction and the political
stakes are automatically higher than in an ordinary extradition case.
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Several possible "solutions" to this problem exist, none of which are
wholly satisfactory. The US might negotiate supplemental agreements, either to
individual SOFAs or to the NATO SOFA. These agreements face the same
difficulties as all international agreements-agreement upon the language,
negotiation of details, and the securing of legislative approval. Given the
increasingly high profile of the death penalty as a domestic political issue, both
in the US and in Europe, this process would require a delicate approach. The
real problem, however, is what the agreements would say. The US is highly
unlikely to develop any type of institutionalized exception to the death penalty
for foreign policy reasons, including some that extend beyond the
servicemembers question.28 Even though the death penalty is a contentious issue
in US politics, it is still legal in this country and is in fact supported by a majority
of Americans. 29 Promising not to impose the death penalty on servicemembers
who commit a crime abroad but are subject to US jurisdiction might be seen as
acquiescing to the politics of the host nation and undermining the military's own
judicial system.
European countries are equally unlikely to sign an agreement that always
assigns primary jurisdiction to the US in every case. The cause of the conflict is
that Europe wants to prevent capital punishment, and abdicating all
responsibility does not fit well with either the language or the spirit of the
European Convention Protocols. The US, on the other hand, will almost
certainly not assign primary jurisdiction to the host nation in all cases, for several
reasons. The US tends to be uncomfortable subjecting its citizens to foreign
criminal justice systems generally, and the military in particular prides itself on
implementing its own disciplinary system.
In the case of US military servicemembers stationed abroad, future cases
might follow the reasoning of the Dutch appellate court in the Short case and
find that the SOFA and Protocol obligations are not inconsistent by reasoning
that the Protocols do not apply to American servicemembers. But even then,
other governments may, like the Netherlands, still require an assurance that the
US will not seek a death sentence. While this worked in the Short case, the US
would not accept such an assurance as a consistent policy, and there is no
guarantee that other European courts will reach the same result as the Short
case.
To address the form, if not the substance, of this concern, the US policy
could be an unofficial one. These competing jurisdiction cases are rare. The US
could respond to each jurisdictional challenge with an agreement not to seek a
death sentence in that case but leave open the question of future cases. Such a
28
29
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procedure would hopefully avoid causing a major diplomatic incident and yet
reach a satisfactory compromise.
However, ad hoc policies such as this present their own problems. They
may allow politicians on both sides of the dispute to use jurisdictional disputes
as publicity platforms and place the accused servicemember in an uncomfortable
limbo. As the Short case illustrated, a jurisdictional dispute might also result in
no state having jurisdiction to impose criminal punishment at all. Nevertheless,
such jurisdictional conflicts only arise in rare circumstances and therefore may
be best handled on a case-by-case basis.
The political sensitivity of the issue is further inflamed by the current
international climate. For example, in addition to disagreement with the US over
the war in Iraq, European countries are refusing to extradite terrorist suspects to
the US, in part because of US death penalty laws and in part because of concerns
about military tribunals.3 ° While the case of a terrorist suspect is obviously
different from that of a US soldier accused of a crime while serving overseas, it
illustrates how contentious the issue of criminal jurisdiction is and sets a poor
precedent for the handling of jurisdictional issues cases in the future.
No matter what the final policy choice of the US is, bilateral and
multilateral jurisdictional issues with respect to US servicemembers stationed
abroad will certainly not become any easier. Opposition to the death penalty is
growing both in the US and abroad, and the US is growing increasingly distant
from European viewpoints on many international issues. The growing
divergence between the US and European perspectives on the death penalty and
other matters only promises additional difficulties in an already complex area of
international law.
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